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Abstract 
Better firm reputation could lead acquirers to pay a premium for the target. Using a cross-country 
sample between 2007 and 2017, we examine how firm environmental, social, and governance 
related reputational risk affects acquisition premiums in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
We find that targets with worse reputations tend to have lower acquisition premiums in cross-
border deals, and this relation remains robust after controlling for characteristics affecting the 
investment environment. Additionally, the difference in reputational risk between target and 
acquirer matters, and the acquirer is likely to pay less for a target that has a worse reputation 
than acquirer itself. In particular, we construct a signal-country analysis based on U.S. targets 
to further examine this transfer effect in the reputational capital and find a consistent negative 
association between the difference in reputational risk and acquisition premium. These results 
suggest that target’s social performance is an important determinant of the merger performance, 
and they support the signaling theory that a firm’s reputation could send a signal about its overall 
quality.  
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	 iii	
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my greatest appreciation to my supervisors, Dr. Min Maung and Dr. 
Craig Wilson, who have been not only great supervisors but also valued friends to me since I 
started my master’s program. I am truly grateful for their tremendous guidance and help on my 
thesis as well as on my life. This work would not be finished without their patience, 
encouragement and knowledge.  
I would also like to thank my committee member Dr. Fan Yang and my external examiner Dr. 
Steven Zheng for their helpful comments. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Abdullah 
Mamun, the Graduate Chair in Finance, for his support and help during the past two years.  
Last but not the least, great thanks are for my family and friends, for their unconditional love 
and support, both financially and emotionally. 
  
	 iv	
Table of Contents 
Permission to Use	...................................................................................................................	i	
Abstract	..................................................................................................................................	ii	
Acknowledgments	.................................................................................................................	iii	
Table of Contents	..................................................................................................................	iv	
List of Tables	..........................................................................................................................	v	
Chapter 1: Introduction	........................................................................................................	1	
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development	...............................................	4	
2.1 Literature Review	...............................................................................................................................	4	
2.1.1 Signaling theory and firm reputation	..........................................................................................	4	
2.1.2 Cross-border acquisition premium	..............................................................................................	6	
2.1.3 Signaling theory in cross-border acquisition premium	...............................................................	8	
2.2 Hypothesis Development	...................................................................................................................	9	
Chapter 3: Data Description	................................................................................................	11	
3.1 Data Selection	..................................................................................................................................	11	
3.2 Dependent Variable	.........................................................................................................................	12	
Chapter 4: Results	................................................................................................................	18	
4.1 Main Regression	..............................................................................................................................	18	
4.2 Investment Environment Analysis	...................................................................................................	27	
4.3 Robustness Tests	..............................................................................................................................	29	
Chapter 5: Conclusions	........................................................................................................	38	
References	............................................................................................................................	39	
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources	.......................................................................	45	
 
  
	 v	
List of Tables 
 
Table Number                                                                                                            page number 
Table 3.1: Variable Summary Statistics	.......................................................................................	13	
Table 3.2: Observation and Average Premium by Country	..........................................................	14	
Table 4.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix	.........................................................................................	19	
Table 4.2: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium	...................	21	
Table 4.3: OLS Regression of Target/Acquirer RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium	....	24	
Table 4.4: OLS Regression of the Difference in RRIP between Target and Acquirer on Cross-
Border Acquisition Premium	........................................................................................................	26	
Table 4.5: OLS Regression of Target RRIP and Investment Environment Index on Cross-Border 
Acquisition Premium....................................................................................................................	28	
Table 4.6: OLS Regression of the Difference in RRIP between Target and Acquirer for U.S. 
Subsample on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium	......................................................................	30	
Table 4.7: OLS Regression of Target RRIP and the Interaction between Target RRIP and Target 
Legal Origin on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium	...................................................................	32	
Table 4.8: OLS Regression of Target RRI on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium	.....................	33	
Table 4.9: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium (Excluding 
Outliers)	.......................................................................................................................................	34	
Table 4.10: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium (Alternative 
Premium)	......................................................................................................................................	36	
Table 4.11: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium (Excluding 
Hostile)	.........................................................................................................................................	37	
 
	 1	
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Widespread literature that studies how corporate social responsibility (CSR) can influence a 
firm’s success tends to focus on the meaning of responsible behaviors, rather than on the meaning 
of irresponsible behaviors. Previous studies, however, have demonstrated a significant influence 
from corporate social irresponsibility (CSI), arguing that companies acting in the socially 
irresponsible manner can bring negative consequences for themselves such as losing current and 
potential customers and investors (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Fombrun, 1996). According to a 
survey early this year, over 1,000 of top international companies report their greenhouse gas 
emissions and their emissions-reduction targets for next year’s operations1. This reduction-wave 
suggests an increasing concern about reducing a company’s CSI, indicating that the decrease in 
irresponsible behaviors could benefit firm value.  
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) are three key criteria in measuring the 
sustainability and social impact of an investment, which have been widely used in CSR/CSI studies. 
In one of the initial studies on CSR, Carroll (1979) presented a model for testing firm’s corporate 
social performance based on economic, legal and ethical responsibilities, where environmental 
issues were embedded in the economic and legal dimensions. Since then, the ESG issues have been 
widely discussed in CSR research (Gillan et al., 2010; Jo & Ma, 2012; Halbritter & Dorfleitner, 
2015; Garciaa et al., 2017). Likewise, many researchers also examine the firm’s irresponsible 
behaviors in the ESG domains (Oikonomou et al., 2012; Kölbel et al., 2017). As CSR’s negative 
counterpart, CSI is conceptualized by stakeholder theory as an opposite force to CSR because of 
its negative impact on firm performance, including sales revenue losses, increased financial risks 
and capital costs (Lange & Washburn, 2012; Oikonomou, Brooks, & Pavelin, 2012). Moreover, 
as implied by the ratings from the KLD dataset, which have been used as the proxy for a firm’s 
social performance by lots of CSR-related literature, firms can be simultaneously socially 
responsible and irresponsible. Regardless of that, many CSR studies have combined CSR and CSI 
into one single concept by using this dataset, failing to differentiate CSR from CSI (Strike et al., 
2006; Lange & Washburn, 2012). Therefore, our focus is on how the firm’s social irresponsibility 
could influence firm value and its financial performance.  
Given the association between CSR and CSI, it is worth understanding how CSR affects firm 
value to further investigate the influence of CSI, and there has been a growing concern about 
                                                
1 https://www.greenbiz.com/article/how-get-suppliers-act-climate 
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whether CSR would benefit firm value or not in the context of the acquisition premium. In M&As, 
acquirers typically face information asymmetry as targets often hide negative information about 
themselves. To help solve this problem, acquirers must use signals available to get additional 
information about targets’ quality (Connelly et al., 2011). Meanwhile, targets have the intention to 
send out positive signals about themselves for a higher purchase price (Reuer et al., 2012). 
Literature has shown that CSR could convey those signals to mitigate the information asymmetry. 
Based on the work conducted by Fisman et al. (2006) that good CSR can act as a credible signal 
of firm trustworthiness in providing high-quality products, Lagas (2013) argues that targets with 
better CSR are likely to be taken over at higher premiums, suggesting that the target’s CSR could 
be a powerful positive signal in M&As. Using U.S. public merger and acquisition deals from 1992 
to 2013, Malik (2014) finds that the acquisition premium increases with target’s CSR, and this 
association is stronger for high-CSR acquirers compared with low-CSR acquirers. Likewise, Choi 
et al. (2015) construct a sample of 215 cash-only U.S. acquisitions between 1995 and 2013 and 
report similar findings.  
Instead of analyzing how a firm “doing good” could benefit its value, in this paper, we focus 
on how a firm “doing bad” could hurt its value, which is its socially irresponsible behaviors. 
Meanwhile, with the increasing complexity in cross-border M&As, international deals face more 
severe information asymmetry and risker misevaluation compared with domestic activities. 
Therefore, we construct a sample of cross-border M&As announced between the period of 2007 
and 2017 to examine the relationship between a firm’s reputational risk and the cross-border 
acquisition premium. Many studies on the acquisition premium have applied signaling theory 
(Laamanen, 2007; Reuer et al., 2012; Schijven & Hitt, 2012), and our perspective is that the 
acquirer is willing to pay a premium for a target with a better reputation as it sends a positive signal 
about the target’s quality. Although it is difficult to empirically measure a firm’s reputation, we 
measure the reputational risk of ESG issues as the second-best solution. Thus, we collect the 
RepRisk data (RRI index), a proprietary algorithm developed by the RepRisk dataset that 
dynamically captures and quantifies a firm’s reputational risk exposure related to ESG issues on a 
monthly basis since January 2007, and Peak RepRisk data (RRIP index), which equals the highest 
level of the RRI index over the last two years, as the proxy for the target’s and acquirer’s 
reputational risk. The RepRisk platform systematically screens thousands of information sources 
and collects negative news, controversies, and criticism about companies worldwide, including 
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activities that violate human rights, destruct environment and involve poor working conditions. 
Then, it uses a unique methodology to quantify a company’s exposure to controversial ESG issues 
based on the severity of the content, the authority of the information sources and the frequency of 
the information (Cui et al., 2018).  
The acquisition premium data is from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database, which is 
the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before the announcement. 
Our empirical results show that, the target with a better reputation is associated with a higher 
acquisition premium in cross-border deals, indicating that the signal associated with target’s 
reputation plays a significant role in mitigating information asymmetry and, therefore, affects the 
acquisition premium. Additionally, we find that the difference in reputational risk between target 
and acquirer is significantly and negatively associated with the cross-border acquisition premium, 
even after controlling for firm level, deal level, and country level characteristics, which suggests a 
potential transfer effect in the reputational capital after the acquisition.  
Our cross-country analysis, however, has some limitations as it is hard to control for the 
differences in the same industry across countries. Therefore, we conduct a single country study 
based on U.S. domestic and cross-border M&As to further examine the target reputation 
transferability. Again, we find a significantly negative relation between the difference in the 
reputational risk and the acquisition premium. The results support the idea that the acquirer is 
willing to pay more for a target that has a better reputation than itself.  
Additionally, we further examine the impact of different investment environment on cross-
border M&A premiums by controlling for the investment environment characteristics since cross-
border acquisition premiums vary across countries due to this difference. The empirical results 
provide evidence that the negative association between firm’s reputational risk and acquisition 
premium holds after controlling for investor protection, judicial efficiency, and accounting 
standards, and the investment environment indices are significantly and positively associated with 
acquisition premium in international M&As after controlling for firm/deal/country level 
characteristics.  
Our paper belongs to the growing literature explaining the cross-country variation in social 
performances around the world. Recent studies show that better CSR is associated with better 
acquisition performances and higher acquisition premiums in both cross-border and domestic deals 
(Malik, 2014; Choi et al., 2015; Gomes & Marsat, 2017). Our study, instead, analyzes how a firm 
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doing irresponsibly destroys its value by focusing on its negative ESG issues. The results indicate 
that firm’s worse ESG performance is associated with a lower premium in cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents different arguments that link 
firm reputation to acquisition premium in cross-border M&As. Section 3 illustrates our data, 
methodology, and the empirical design. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 
5 summaries and concludes. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In M&A transactions, especially cross-border deals, acquires typically have incomplete 
information about the target, making it harder for them to evaluate the company. To alleviate this 
problem, it is essential for acquirers to use signals available to get extra information about the 
target’s quality. Given the importance of signals, many studies on acquisition premium have 
applied signaling theory.  
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Signaling theory and firm reputation 
Signaling theory is essentially concerned about examining the information asymmetry 
between the two parties. Spence’s (1973) preliminary work on job market signaling illustrates that 
high-quality applicants can distinguish themselves from low-quality applicants through the 
observable and costly signal of higher education if this education is positively related to the 
unobservable productivity.  
This work trigged a large amount of research applying signaling theory to selection scenarios, 
many of which have focused on how corporate social responsibility (CSR) could convey signals 
about one firm’s quality. From capital benefits, Goss & Roberts (2011) examine the relationship 
between CSR and bank debt based on 3996 loans to U.S. firms and find that socially responsible 
firms pay less than firms that are less responsible, indicating a lower cost of debt for firms with 
better social responsibility. Likewise, Ye & Zhang (2011), using a sample of Chinses firms from 
2007 to 2008, also find that improved corporate social responsibility reduces a firm’s debt 
financing costs. Richardson et al. (2001) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011), on the other hand, demonstrate 
a negative relation between CSR and the cost of equity capital. From ethical theory’s perspective, 
Chih, Shen & Kang (2008) conduct a cross-country study and illustrate that a greater committee 
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to CSR can help reduce earning smoothing and earnings losses avoidance. Kim et al. (2012) also 
demonstrate that firms are less likely to manipulate real operating activities and manage earnings 
through accruals when they are more socially responsible. Overall, CSR conveys information 
about a firm’s quality and sends a positive signal to all stakeholders of its reputation (Linthicum 
et al., 2010). 
As most studies examine how a firm being socially responsible sends a positive signal about 
its overall quality, our research focuses on the negative influence of a firm’s irresponsible 
behaviors. Similar to the positive influences from socially responsible behaviors, negative effects 
from socially irresponsible manners, such as environmental destruction or poor labor conditions, 
may threaten the firm’s social license to operate, and further worry investors about its future 
growth. A growing body of literature documents that irresponsible behaviors could detract from 
the firm value (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2009; Jo & Na, 2012; Gregory et al., 2014). Also, existing 
analyses investigating stakeholders’ and consumers’ reactions to socially irresponsible behaviors, 
including moral outrage and righteous anger, demonstrate that those negative feelings can create 
negative company image (Lindenmeier et al., 2012; Grappi et al., 2013b) and motivate consumer 
boycott (Braunsberger and Buckler 2011; Cronin et al. 2012) and negative attitudes toward the 
company (Grappi et al., 2013a, b). Overall, a corporation will lose trust and social legitimacy if it 
is seen as being irresponsible (Price & Sun, 2017). 
Compared with company’s “good” behaviors, “bad” behaviors, however, seem to bring more 
dramatic and negative influences to the firm value. The stock market has seemed to be relatively 
more sensitive to bad news than to good news as behavioral psychology suggests that a bad shock 
can correct the market’s over-optimism. For example, in the UK stock market, the stock prices of 
many stocks continued to decline significantly after reporting bad news 2 . Veronesi (1999) 
introduces a dynamic equilibrium model to examine how the stock market reacts differently to 
good news and bad news. Using the equilibrium price function, he demonstrates that the stock 
market overreacts to bad news in good times, which is further developed by Conrad et al. (2002). 
Their study, based on a sample of annual earnings announcements between 1988 and 1998, 
confirms that the stock price of individual firms responds more dramatically to bad news in good 
times, and the level of response rises with the market level. They argue that, compared with good 
news, which is already anticipated by the market, the bad news is more surprising, leading to a 
                                                
2 https://www.sharesmagazine.co.uk/article/is-the-stock-market-over-reacting-to-bad-news-with-large-share-price-declines 
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larger negative stock return. Therefore, consistent with previous work, our perspective is that when 
a firm acts irresponsibly and is criticized by the media, its firm value will be hurt more strongly 
than the benefits that good behaviors could bring to it.  
Regarding the firm’s irresponsible manners, the media can influence the reputational capital 
of firms by generating public scrutiny to discipline firms’ actions (Baloria et al., 2018). Therefore, 
our study measures a firm’s reputational risk based on the RepRisk data. Launched in 2007, the 
RepRisk ESG Platform monitors the environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) risk 
exposure of companies worldwide by systematically capturing negative incidents, criticism and 
controversies on a daily basis from over 80,000 media, stakeholders and third-party sources, 
including all major print and online media, NGOs, regulators, news sites, governmental agencies 
and social media3. The data collected, covering 28 ESG issues, such as activities involve human 
rights violations, poor working conditions, corruption, and environmental destruction, is then used 
to calculate the ESG-related reputational risk exposure score, RepRisk Index (RRI), which is 
considered an indicator of one firm’s reputational risk (Cui et al., 2018).  
Considering the importance of the reputational capital, Gloßne (2017) investigates the 
relationship between the ESG risk exposure and long-run stock return of firms located in the U.S. 
and Europe based on the RepRisk data from 2009 to 2016, and finds that value-weighted portfolios 
of U.S. firms and European firms that have ESG issue history face significant negative abnormal 
stock return. He explains that firms with higher ESG risks usually have weaker operating 
performances and more negative earnings surprises. Therefore, they experience more negative 
earnings announcement returns than other competitors. Li & Wu (2017) also use the RepRisk data 
to measure the ESG impact for public and private firms globally between 2007 and 2015 to 
examine whether CSR engagements could generate real societal benefits. Their findings show that 
private firms can reduce the negative influence from their ESG controversies by increasing their 
CSR engagements. In general, reputational capital is an important intangible asset, through which 
firms can signal their key characteristics to stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), and the 
increase in ESG incident issues could signal more serious problems about one firm.  
2.1.2 Cross-border acquisition premium 
The quick development of globalization has dramatically increased the volume of cross-
border M&A deals. In 1997, there were only about 2,000 cross-border M&A deals, worth 
                                                
3 https://www.reprisk.com/our-approach 
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approximately $163 billion, while in 2017, the international M&A market reported $1.17 trillion 
in value.  
The booming M&A market has received considerable attention from researchers, but 
comparatively less literature has investigated in the cross-border acquisition premium. The widely 
used definition of acquisition premium suggests that premium is an overpayment for acquirers as 
it consumes the expected synergies that would be achieved after the transaction (Sirower, 1997). 
Acquirers, however, continue to pay approximately 20-30 percent of the total transaction value as 
the premium (Laamanen, 2007). For example, the premium that paid by U.S firms is on average 
30% to 50% of the target market values during the past three decades (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997). To find out the characteristics of cross-border acquisition premium, Rossi & Volpin (2004) 
conduct a cross-country analysis on international M&A deals by examining the differences in laws 
and regulations across countries. Their results show that premium is higher in countries with higher 
shareholder protection, although those are driven by the U.S. and UK firms. There are two reasons 
for the positive relation between the acquisition premium and shareholder protection. Firstly, the 
cost of capital is relatively reduced in those countries. Secondly, diffuse ownership is more 
common for countries with higher shareholder protection, leading to the free-rider problem during 
the acquisition, which forces bidders in those countries to pay a higher premium than otherwise 
(Grossman & Hart, 1980). Also, to test whether premium measures the private benefits of control, 
they include the difference in shareholder protection between acquirer and target and find 
insignificant results, suggesting that premium is a proxy for the total premium available to all 
shareholders, not for personal gains. This insignificant result also indicates that there is no much 
difference in premiums between acquires from countries with better shareholder protection and 
acquirers from countries with worse shareholder protection.  
According to a survey conducted by McKinsey, institutional investors are willing to pay 
more for companies with better corporate governance, and the level of premium varies across 
countries (Newell & Wilson, 2002). Consistent with this result, Starks & Wei (2013), using 371 
cross-border mergers of U.S. targets between 1980 and 1998, find a significantly negative relation 
between the acquisition premium and the quality of the foreign acquirer’s governance for stock 
deals. They argue that this is because acquirers want to compensate target shareholders for the 
future exposure to inferior corporate governance. Interestingly, the key assumption of their 
findings is that the U.S. firms have superior corporate governance practices than other countries, 
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which corresponds to the U.S./UK driving factor concluded by Rossi & Volpin (2004) to some 
extent.  
With the upward trend in M&As, the use of investment bankers in acquisitions has increased 
simultaneously. Between 1981 and 2002, the use of investment banks in M&As increased from 
78% in 1981 to 88% in 1999 (Porrini, 2006). In 2007, when the M&A market experienced the 
most recent peak, 85% of these deals were advised by investment banks, generating about $39.7 
billion in advisory fees4. This calls attention to the question of whether hiring investment banks 
could benefit the firm or not during the M&A negotiation process and leads to different empirical 
discussions. With their advisory roles, investment banks are expected to help negotiate acquisition 
premiums (Eccles and Crane, 1988; Haunschild, 1994). As the acquisition premium is the 
difference between the estimated firm value and the actual price paid to acquire the target, any 
premium that is more than what the acquirer needs to pay to secure the deal should be considered 
too much if the markets are efficient with no information asymmetry. Through investment banks’ 
expert knowledge and skills, they can affect the acquisition premiums during the acquisition 
process. Targets hire advisors to get a higher premium while acquirers hire bankers to negotiate 
for a lower premium. However, due to the contingent fee structure, acquirers’ investment bankers 
could be motivated to increase acquisition premium for self-interest, which might mislead 
acquirers to end up paying beyond the reasonable amount. Therefore, there is a potential interest 
conflict between the acquirers and their investment bankers. Considering this dilemma, prior 
studies have questioned the role of advisories on acquisition premium, demonstrating that 
contingent contracts create conflicts of interest between the investment bank and the firm 
(McLaughlin, 1990; Kesner et al., 1994). 
2.1.3 Signaling theory in cross-border acquisition premium 
Due to the information asymmetry between the target and acquirer, both parties are 
motivated to use signals available to maximize their profits. On the one hand, acquirers must use 
signals that could provide additional information about the target to avoid mispricing the deal 
(Connelly et al., 2011). On the other hand, targets are likely to send out positive signals to 
maximize its purchase price (Akerlof, 1970; Reuer et al., 2012). Therefore, several M&A studies 
focus on signaling theory with its implications of being able to reduce information asymmetries. 
Based on U.S. domestic acquisitions, Laamanen (2007) finds that R&D capitals and R&D growth 
                                                
4 Source: Thomson Financial SDC. 
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rates could be signals about a technology-based target’s prospect that can be detected by acquirers. 
He reports a significant positive relation between acquisition premium and R&D capitals/growth 
rates. Additionally, he finds that there is a significant negative association between acquisition 
premium and target’s market-to-book ratio, the reason being that targets whose market values are 
significantly above their book values are believed to be overvalued, which are less likely to gain 
additional growth that an acquirer can realistically expect after the acquisition. Therefore, the 
premium is lower. Reuer et al. (2012), instead, look at this problem from the point of view of a 
target’s interrelationship with others, and suggest that acquirers are willing to pay more for an IPO 
target affiliated with prominent underwriters, venture capitalists, and alliance partners.  
As one of the firms’ most important intangible assets, reputational capital has been 
considered helpful in reducing information asymmetry (Cui et al., 2018) as it can signal additional 
information about firms to avoid adverse selection, and theories suggest that spending on CSR 
may help improve corporate reputation (Brown & Dacin, 1997). Therefore, a firm’s CSR has 
become a tool to determine reputable companies (Aksak et al., 2016). By testing the relationship 
between the acquisition premium and target’s social performance based on a sample of U.S. 
domestic acquisitions, Malik (2014) and Choi et al. (2015) find that there is a positive relation 
between the premium paid by acquirers and targets’ CSR, indicating that the information on a 
target’s CSR rating scores can send a positive signal about the target firm. Inspired by their work, 
Gomes and Marsat (2017), using the data provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 as the proxy for 
firm’s CSR, examine the impact of CSR performance in the context of cross-border acquisition 
premium, and demonstrate that targets’ CSR performance is positively associated with the 
acquisition premiums, consistent with previous literature.  
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Following the literature review, it should be clear that cross-border M&A involves additional 
complexity and risks due to the differences in culture, investment environment and regulations. 
However, in a similar vein, cross-border deals feature similar, or even more severe information 
asymmetries as acquirers need to navigate the differences in corporate governance, cultures, 
languages and accounting standards, as well as the hindrance of geographic distance (Ellis et al., 
2011; Ahern et al., 2011; Erel et al., 2012). These factors make it more difficult for acquirers to 
accurately estimate the value and risks of the targets in cross-border transactions. Hence, acquirers 
involved in international deals should be more motivated to grasp available signals for additional 
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information, and target’s reputational risk is one of the factors that we believe could affect target’s 
valuation and attractiveness, which should be observed in the form of the acquisition premium.  
This signaling effect from a firm’s reputation, however, could influence the firm’s stock 
price in both positive and negative ways. Due to the bad brand image, it is possible that one firm’s 
stock price might suffer significant drop when some serious incidents happen, leading to the 
increase in the acquisition premium as the stock price is in the denominator when calculating the 
acquisition premium. Our perspective is that, the decrease in the stock price can’t compensate for 
the more dramatic decrease in the estimated firm value after the severe controversies, suggesting 
a negative association between the reputational risk and the acquisition premium. Companies that 
seek mergers and acquisitions are motivated by the synergies expected after the transaction, and 
corporate reputation could serve as a transferable synergy-enhancing asset (Brandtzæg, 2014). 
Therefore, targets with higher reputational risks are expected to provide lower reputational 
synergies after the acquisition, decreasing the valuation of the targets. Bendixen, Bukasa & Abratt 
(2004), for example, demonstrate that high brand equity could yield a price premium. Therefore, 
we formally state our prediction in the following hypothesis:  
H1: Target’s reputational risk is negatively associated with the acquisition premium in cross-
border M&As. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that if targets have less reputational risk than acquirers 
themselves, it is likely that acquirers are willing to pay more for those targets as a way to improve 
their corporate brand image after the transaction. This reputation transferability is more critical in 
international deals as the foreign acquirer can benefit from the good reputation and existing 
customers of the local target, mitigating the uncertainty caused by the differences in culture, legal 
system and corporate governance. Accordingly, the transfer of good reputation from the target 
could result in a more favorable attitude from local consumers toward a cross-border acquisition 
(Fong et al., 2013). Using a sample of 124 acquiring companies in 29 countries, Barua (2017) 
suggests that acquirers should take target’s corporate reputation into consideration since this can 
lead to a high degree of corporate brand architecture, which in return will increase acquirer’s 
market share, sales growth, and profitability after the transaction, resulting a relatively higher 
premium for targets with a better reputation. Another possible reason is that, for targets, it might 
be more efficient for them to be acquired by other better firms than to try to fix their existing 
problems alone. In this case, the targets are willing to accept a lower purchase price as an exchange 
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for the financial support from acquirers with better reputation after the transaction. Thus, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The difference between the target’s reputational risk and acquirer’s reputational risk is 
negatively associated with the acquisition premium in cross-border M&As. 
Chapter 3: Data Description 
3.1 Data Selection 
Our sample contains cross-border mergers and acquisitions announced between January 1st, 
2007 and December 31st, 2017, completed as of February 1st, 2018, and reported by SDC Platinum, 
a database from Thomson Financial. The sample period is limited by the availability of our data 
from the RepRisk dataset for measuring a firm’s reputational risk as RepRisk’s data history spans 
back to January 2007. Since we focus on the target that could clearly and completely affect its 
acquirer through its reputation, we only include acquisitions when acquirers obtain 100% of targets’ 
shares after the transaction. The sample excludes firms in the utilities and financial sectors, 
consistent with prior studies because of the historically regulated nature of the two industries as 
well as the dramatic regulatory changes that occurred during our sample period (for example, the 
regulatory responses to the subprime crisis in 2009). Moreover, financial firms are typically highly 
leveraged, which do not have the same meanings as for non-financial firms. Therefore, we exclude 
those firms to ensure that skewed financial fundamentals do not drive our results.  
The availability of empirical measures of firm reputational risk from the RepRisk dataset 
limits our set to 36 countries. The preliminary sample from SDC includes 770 deals, and the 
excluded deals represent about 72% of the original dataset in number and 27% in value.  
Appendix describes the variables we use in this paper and specifies their sources. These 
variables can be classified into three broad categories. The first set is at the country level, including 
a dummy for the legal origin of each country and proxies for investment environment. The second 
category measures characteristics at the individual deal level, such as the premium paid, the means 
of payment, the number of advisors involved in the transaction, and the transaction volume, etc. 
Our third set of variables is at the firm level, and this covers target’s industry information and 
target’s size, which is the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement 
of the deal in US$ million.  
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3.2 Dependent Variable 
Acquisition premium is widely defined by the previous literature as the bid price as a 
percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before the announcement (Rau & 
Vermaelen, 1998; Rossi & Vopin, 2004; Reuer et al., 2012; Qiu et al., 2014). Following Rossi & 
Vopin (2004)’s work, we use the natural logarithm of premium in percentage as our dependent 
variable.  
Table 3.1 presents all the variables’ statistic properties of our sample. The number of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions is 219. The mean of the dependent variable, Lnpremium4week, is 
appropriately 3.344 with a standard deviation of 1.109 while the average RRIP for all the target 
companies is 20.37 with a standard deviation of 17.96. We also include the summary statistics for 
the premium in percentage, and the mean of it is 42.08% while the standard deviation of it is 41.92. 
Starks & Wei (2013) report a mean of cross-border premium in percentage as 36.47% and Gomes 
and Marsat (2017) demonstrate the average cross-border premium in percentage as 32.1%, similar 
to our results.  
In Table 3.2, we sort the data on M&A activity by target country, including the average 
volume, the average premium paid by acquirers for each country and the percentage of each 
country’s cross-border M&As in value. Obviously, different countries play different roles in the 
global M&A market. For instance, the U.S. has the highest volume among all the other countries, 
representing 39.73% in deal number and 52.54% in deal value of the whole sample. Regarding 
premiums, New Zealand has the highest premium compared with others while target from 
Switzerland, instead, received the lowest premium in our sample. To eliminate the possible 
influences from the outliers, we conduct a separate robustness test without countries that have 
extremely high premiums (New Zealand and Japan) and countries that have extremely low 
premiums (Switzerland). The results are reported in Table 4.9.  
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Table 3.1: Variable Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the major dependent and independent variables. The primary dependent 
variable, premium is measured by natural logarithm of bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four 
weeks before the announcement. In our regressions, we adjust two of these variables using natural logarithms 
including: the deal value and the target size.  
 
 MEAN STDEV MIN MEDIAN MAX N 
Premium       
Premium4week(percentage) 42.08 41.92 0.22 35.59 510.1 219 
Lnpremium4week 3.344 1.109 -1.51 3.54 6.23 219 
       
Firm-level Variables       
Target RRIP 20.37 17.96 0 25 68 219 
Acquirer RRIP 29.12 18.72 0 32 74 176 
Difference in RRIP -9.528 20.31 -69 0 57 176 
Horizontal 0.644 0.48 0 1 1 219 
Lntargetequity 7.306 1.843 -0.21 7.41 11.54 219 
       
Deal-level Variables       
Lndv 6.839 2.193 -2.98 7.16 11.53 219 
Cashdeal 0.731 0.445 0 1 1 219 
Hostile 0.0137 0.117 0 0 1 219 
Tender 0.475 0.501 0 0 1 219 
Contested 0.0731 0.261 0 0 1 219 
Crossborder 0.282 0.451 0 0 1 241 
Targetadvisor 1.557 1.062 0 1 7 219 
Acquireradvisor 1.712 1.308 0 1 8 219 
       
Country-level Variables       
Targetlo 0.735 0.442 0 1 1 219 
Acquirerlo 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 219 
ADRI  4.211 1.231 0 5 5 213 
ANTI 3.627 0.868 1 3.5 5 217 
Enforcement 9.474 1.128 5 10 10 213 
Accounting 69.41 11.31 0 71 83 213 
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Table 3.2: Observation and Average Premium by Country 
Summary statistics on the sample of individual cross-border M&A deals sorted by target country announced 
between January 1st, 2007 and December 31st, 2017. Premium is natural logarithm of the bid price as a percentage of 
the closing price of the target four weeks before the announcement.  
 
Country Deal Value Premium 
 Number of 
Deals 
Numbers (%) Mean Proportion 
(%) 
Mean Std. Dev 
Australia 12 5.48 1210.45 1.46 3.62 0.87 
Austria 1 0.46 1756.99 0.18 1.79 0.00 
Belgium 3 1.37 4705.95 1.42 1.86 1.81 
Bermuda 1 0.46 3017.31 0.30 4.12 0.00 
Brazil 5 2.28 2110.39 1.06 3.24 0.63 
Canada 11 5.02 2071.64 2.28 3.36 1.75 
China 1 0.46 843.27 0.08 3.11 0.00 
Colombia 1 0.46 13.79 0.00 0.10 0.00 
Denmark 2 0.91 3610.56 0.72 3.19 0.95 
Finland 4 1.83 793.21 0.32 2.14 2.48 
France 9 4.11 785.96 0.71 3.13 1.11 
Germany 7 3.20 779.97 0.55 3.07 1.01 
Gibraltar 1 0.46 1623.55 0.16 4.16 0.00 
Greece 2 0.91 190.36 0.04 1.92 1.42 
Hong Kong 4 1.83 6522.25 2.62 3.54 0.41 
India 2 0.91 194.22 0.04 3.79 0.77 
Ireland-Rep 2 0.91 27095.30 5.43 3.16 0.41 
Israel 3 1.37 5517.37 1.66 3.79 0.53 
Italy 2 0.91 733.08 0.15 1.83 1.98 
Japan 2 0.91 2843.43 0.57 4.72 0.17 
Netherlands 4 1.83 6555.96 2.63 2.91 0.70 
New Zealand 1 0.46 608.94 0.06 4.76 0.00 
Nigeria 1 0.46 124.10 0.01 3.54 0.00 
Norway 5 2.28 469.74 0.24 2.88 2.03 
Pakistan 1 0.46 329.74 0.03 0.76 0.00 
Poland 2 0.91 6.74 0.00 2.81 1.57 
Russian Fed 1 0.46 1375.67 0.14 4.67 0.00 
Singapore 6 2.74 954.93 0.57 3.60 0.57 
South Africa 4 1.83 5937.54 2.38 2.89 1.02 
Spain 1 0.46 1583.00 0.16 3.43 0.00 
Sri Lanka 1 0.46 0.05 0.00 2.22 0.00 
Sweden 4 1.83 2200.10 0.88 3.54 0.89 
Switzerland 1 0.46 47.56 0.00 -0.53 0.00 
Taiwan 1 0.46 202.06 0.02 2.85 0.00 
United Kingdom 24 10.96 8552.40 20.58 3.54 0.86 
United States 87 39.73 6022.83 52.54 3.57 0.80 
       
Total 219      
World Average  4553.89  3.34 1.11 
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3.3 Test Variable 
To measure a firm’s reputational risk, we collect our reputational risk exposure score using 
data from the RepRisk platform, a dataset that focuses on risk-related data for all companies across 
the world that have been exposed to ESG risks. RepRisk, with the coverage of 28 ESG issues and 
45 ESG topics, collects and analyzes negative incidents, criticism, and controversies from 
thousands of sources on a daily basis. Those collected data is then converted to a monthly-updated 
score, the RRI index, for each company through a unique methodology. This data is uniquely 
suitable for our study for two reasons. Firstly, different from KLD database that only focuses on 
publicly traded U.S. companies, the RepRisk platform provides access to ESG-related reputational 
risk exposure score for companies from different countries including emerging and frontier 
markets, helping us to get a broader sample for our cross-country study. Secondly, KLD indices 
are frequently based on subjective analyst ratings and self-reported documents, which might lead 
to biased results. The RepRisk dataset, in contrast, uses an approach that allows for a more frequent 
and objective assessment of ESG impact on each firm over time, giving us a more comprehensive 
understanding of one firm’s reputational risk exposure. More importantly, the data provided by 
RepRisk look at similar information as KLD database does, which has been widely used for CSR 
study that monitors a firm’s social responsibility. This enables us to relate our study to previous 
CSR literature for theoretical support and insights. Some literature, such as Gomes and Marsat 
(2017), uses the rating score provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 as the proxy for a firm’s 
social performance. This database is based on data provided by ASSET4, a leading global ESG 
score provider, and the ratings are derived from 226 Key Performance Indicators. However, as 
ASSET4 data measure the socially responsible and irresponsible manners through one combined 
score reflecting the overall social performance of firms, it does not match our major research 
purpose, which is to concentrate on the influence from socially irresponsible behaviors. 
Furthermore, ASSET4 is aimed at examining environmental, social and governance dimensions 
separately, a feature that is not necessary for our study. In addition, both KLD database and 
ASSET4 database are mainly based on company reports, filings and their websites, which are more 
likely to be manipulated and biased than sources such as public media, stakeholder, and third-party 
information where RepRisk collects data from. Therefore, we eventually decide to focus on the 
RepRisk data.  
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Two major RepRisk indices have been used in prior literature, the peak RRI index and 
current RRI index. The peak RepRisk Index (RRIP) is equal to the highest level of the RRI index 
over the last two years, a proxy for overall ESG and business risk exposure, and is recommended 
by RepRisk when analyzing and comparing firms along with their ESG risk exposure. Current RRI 
index, instead, is a monthly-updated data that denotes the current risk level of a company related 
to its ESG issues. The index ranges from 0 to 100, and a higher number is associated with higher 
ESG risk exposure. When an ESG issue happens, the index of a firm accordingly increases based 
on the severity, the reach and the novelty of the issue and the intensity of the news about the firm 
(Gloßne, 2017). If there is no negative news, the index will decay over time according to some 
strict rules.  
Our study, with the purpose of having a thorough understanding of a firm’s ESG risk 
exposure, focuses on the RRIP index for two reasons. First of all, as one firm’s viable and heavily 
practiced growth strategy, M&A activity requires a significant amount of time for preparation and 
negotiation, which is more sophisticated in the context of cross-border M&A due to higher 
information asymmetry and significant country differences. De Beaufort & Lempereur (2003) 
demonstrate that lack of trustworthy contracts and information exchange between the acquirer and 
target partially lead to M&A failures in cross-border deals, indicating the importance of 
understanding the factors that influence effective negotiation process. Ahammad et al. (2016), for 
example, provide an empirical examination of those factors and find that communication, national 
cultural distance and organizational cultural differences affect the negotiation process. Due to the 
uncertainty, the merger decision could be time-consuming. Thus, the current value of one firm’s 
RRI score around the announcement date can’t completely describe how this risk exposure affects 
the M&A transaction during the negotiation process. Secondly, the RRIP index is a proxy for a 
firm’s overall ESG related reputational risk exposure, which is the main metric used in analyzing 
the risk exposure of a company according to RepRisk’s methodology. Therefore, this data perfectly 
suits our analysis among different companies regarding their ESG risk exposure.  
 
3.4 Firm, Country, and Deal Characteristics  
Following Rossi & Volpin (2004)’s work on the determinants of cross-border acquisition 
premium, we add three different levels of control variables to capture firm differences and cross-
country differences.  
	 17	
Firm-level characteristics include the industry difference between target and acquirer, which 
equals one if they belong to the same industry at the two-digit SIC-code level, and size, which is 
the logarithm of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the 
deal in US$ million. At the country level, the set of variables include the legal origin of the target 
country and acquirer country, which is equal to 1 if it is a common law system and zero otherwise. 
Rossi & Volpin (2004) find a significant positive association between cross-border acquisition 
premium and shareholder protection of target country. However, due to the lack of data for 
shareholder protection, we decide to use legal origin at the target country level as the proxy for 
investor protection instead. Since La Porta et al. (1998) published a study on the effects of legal 
origin on shareholder protection and found that countries with a common law origin are associated 
with a higher level of shareholder protection, a lot of studies have invested in this topic and report 
similar empirical results (La Porta et al., 2008; Fagernas et al., 2009; Acheson et al., 2016). More 
specifically, Ciobanu (2015) examines how the legal origin of a state can influence M&As through 
an international M&A sample from 30 different countries, and he finds that the legal system 
actually impacts the control premium and the overall M&A market.  
To further examine the effect of different investment environment on international M&As, 
we conduct additional analysis by examining the investment environment that is measured by 
investor protection, accounting standards, and judicial efficiency. Bris and Cabolis (2008), using 
a sample of 506 acquisitions from 39 target countries, find that acquisition premium is higher for 
firms from countries with better shareholder protection and accounting standards. They argue that 
acquirers with a higher accounting standard and shareholder protection are more likely to improve 
the corporate governance of the targets after the deal, which can help increase the target’s value in 
the long run. Thus, they are willing to pay more for the target. However, due to the highly 
correlated nature of these variables, putting all variables in one regression might cause estimation 
problems (Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, we reveal the relationship between the investment 
environment index and the cross-border acquisition premium by adding one index to our model 
each time while controlling for other firm-level, country-level and deal-level characteristics in the 
meantime.  
The last category measures characteristics at individual deal level, including the number of 
target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction, the logarithm of the transaction volume, 
a dummy variable (cash offer) that equals one if it is a cash deal and zero otherwise, a dummy 
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variable (hostile bid) that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise, a dummy variable 
(tender offer) that equals one if the deal is a tender offer and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable 
(contested bid) that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. The 
use of advisors in M&As has been studied by many researchers recently. Through their advisory 
roles, investment banks can affect the acquisition premiums for both acquirers and targets during 
the acquisition negotiation process. Since there is a lack of resources to complete deals, targets and 
acquirers need investment bankers for their professional knowledge and skills. For targets, they 
hire bankers to get the highest premium while for acquirers, they need bankers to negotiate for the 
lowest premium during the transaction. However, as bankers’ fees are a percentage of the 
acquisition premium, acquirers’ investment bankers may increase acquisition premium to get 
higher fees. Therefore, there is potential interest conflict between acquirers and investment bankers. 
Studies have questioned the role of advisories on acquisition transactions, demonstrating that there 
might be misalignment, and hence conflict of interest between banker and firm due to the 
contingent contracts (McLaughlin, 1990; Kesner et al., 1994).  
Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Main Regression 
Table 4.1 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables discussed in the previous 
section. Consistent with our expectation, the Pearson correlation between the acquisition premium 
and target RRIP is significantly negative, -0.15. Similarly, the acquisition premium is negatively 
correlated with the difference in reputational risk between the target and acquirer, -0.27, which 
confirms our expectation that acquirers are more likely to pay less for targets with a worse 
reputation than themselves, indicating a potential transfer effect in the intangible asset, that is, 
reputation building here, after the acquisition.  
Deal value, which is the logarithm of the transaction volume, is significantly and positively 
correlated with acquisition premium, 0.16. Kim & Canina (2013), using a property-level dataset, 
reports similar significantly positive correlation between deal value and acquisition premium, 
suggesting that acquisition premium increases with the deal size. Target legal origin, which equals 
one if it is a common law system and zero if it is a civil law system, is positively and significantly 
correlated with acquisition premium, 0.3, consistent with the results found by Rossi & Volpin 
(2004). Interestingly, there is a significantly positive correlation between the use of advisory from  
	 
Table 4.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Lnpremium4week 1                  
(2) Target RRIP -0.15** 1                 
(3) Difference in RRIP 
-
0.27*** 
 
0.53*** 
 1                
(4) Horizontal 0.08 0.04 -0.03 1               
(5) Lntargetequity 0.005 0.1 -0.12 0.13** 1              
(6) Lndv 0.16** -0.04 -0.22*** 0.08 0.9*** 1             
(7) Cashdeal 0.07 -0.09 -0.1 -0.11 -0.24*** -0.2*** 1            
(8) Hostile -0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 1           
(9) Tender 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.23*** -0.33*** 0.15** 0.12* 1          
(10) Contested 0.104 -0.04 -0.02 0.14** -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.12* 1         
(11) Targetadvisor 0.2*** -0.08 -0.25*** -0.04 0.44*** 0.53*** -0.2*** -0.06 -0.14** 0.07 1        
(12) Acquirerdvisor 0.1 0.122* -0.01 0.03 0.51*** 0.52*** -0.25*** -0.03 -0.08 0.06 0.46*** 1       
(13) Targetlo 0.3*** -0.15** -0.13* 0.03 0.06 0.3*** 0.22*** 0.07 -0.40*** 0.13* 0.13* 0.03 1      
(14) Acquirerlo 0.12* -0.14** -0.19** -0.04 -0.12* -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.16** 0.12* -0.003 -0.11 0.32*** 1     
(15) ADRI 0.3*** -0.2*** -0.2*** -0.01 0.013 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.044 -0.31*** 0.13* 0.11 0.05 0.83*** 0.27*** 1    
(16) ANTI 0.11* 0.02 0.16** -0.17** -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.12* 0.13* 0.17** 0.13** 0.13* 1   
(17) Enforcement 0.23*** -0.2*** -0.2** -0.002 0.09 0.27*** 0.11 0.056 -0.05 0.12* 0.15** 0.07 0.4*** 0.14** 0.34*** -0.2*** 1  
(18) Accounting 0.2*** -0.2*** -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.13* 0.13* 0.056 0.09 0.09 0.19*** 0.06 0.18*** -0.01 0.3*** 0.02 0.5*** 1 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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the target’s side and the acquisition premium, 0.2. Previous literature has reported mixed results 
regarding how hiring the advisory might affect the acquisition premium, and our correlation 
coefficient supports the idea that the cross-border acquisition premium is positively correlated with 
the use of advisory. 
To gain insights into the relation between one firm’s reputational risk and the takeover 
premium in cross-border M&As, we run fix-effects regressions, which examine the association 
between target’s reputational risk and the acquisition premium as shown in Table 4.2. We use the 
sample of cross-border transactions to analyze how the target’s reputational risk might influence 
the acquisition premium by estimating the following specification: !"#	 %&'()*( = , + ./0&#'1	223% + 45 + 6 (4.1) 
where X refers to a set of control variables including the logarithm of the transaction volume, 
horizontal dummy, the logarithm of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the 
announcement of the deal in US$ million, cash deal dummy, hostile deal dummy, tender offer 
dummy, contested deal dummy, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisor and target’s legal 
origin. 
In column 1, we find that the target’s reputational risk is negatively correlated with the 
acquisition premium. An increase in the level of RRIP by one point is associated with a 0.012 
decrease in the logarithm of the premium, which translates into an average decrease of 1.2% in the 
premium. More specifically, the standardized beta coefficient (not shown) for target’s RRIP is -
0.19, indicating that one-point increase in target RRIP’s standard deviations leads to approximately 
0.19 decrease in the premium’s standard deviations, which is more economically significant 
compared to the standardized beta coefficient of deal size, 0.18. The coefficient of the value of the 
deal is positive and significant. That is, larger deals are associated with higher premiums when 
using transaction value as the proxy for deal size. Similar to our results, Loderer and Martin (1990), 
argue that acquirers are more likely to overpay for bigger targets on average because acquirer 
managers could be fascinated by these large acquisitions for the publicity they attract. Moreover, 
top executives may pay a higher premium for large firms for the high private benefits that are often 
provided by large deals (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Harford & Li, 2007). 
In column 2, we add deal-level dummy variables for hostile bid, tender offer and contested 
deal. The results on target RRIP and deal value do not change, and now tender offer is significantly  
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium  
The table presents the results of seven OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variable is target RRIP, which is equal to the highest level of the RRI over the last 
two years. The control variable at the cross-country level is target legal origin, a dummy variable that equals one if 
the country has common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable that equals 
one if they belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables at the 
deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; deal 
value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal and 
zero otherwise; hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender offer, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable 
that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year 
and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Target RRIP -0.012** 
(-2.59) 
-0.011** 
(-2.53) 
-0.01** 
(-2.41) 
 
-0.01* 
(-1.69) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.7) 
-0.012** 
(-2.53) 
-0.008* 
(-1.78) 
Horizontal   0.15 (0.85) 
0.11 
(0.66)  
0.20 
(1.08) 
0.13 
(0.78) 
Target size    
 
 
 0.04 
(0.92) 
-0.035 
(-0.65) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Deal value 0.094*** 
(2.51) 
0.13*** 
(3.13) 
0.09* 
(1.77) 
0.06 
(1.32)    
Cash deal    
0.27 
(1.48) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
 
 
0.23 
(1.29) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
Hostile deal  -0.98 (-1.48) 
-0.81 
(-1.2) 
-1.23* 
(-1.88) 
-0.80 
(-1.17) 
-0.49 
(-0.72) 
-1.05 
(-1.59) 
Tender offer  0.35** (2.10) 
0.30* 
(1.76) 
0.61*** 
(3.46) 
0.19 
(1.18) 
0.16 
(1.00) 
0.54*** 
(3.06) 
Contested deal  0.23 (0.79) 
0.17 
(0.56) 
-0.07 
(-0.24) 
0.33 
(1.1) 
0.2 
(0.65) 
-0.06 
(-0.19) 
Target advisor   0.13 (1.47) 
0.12 
(1.48)  
0.20** 
(2.2) 
0.16* 
(1.94) 
Acquirer advisor   0.05 (0.64) 
0.04 
(0.62)  
0.11 
(1.57) 
0.08 
(1.2) 
Target legal 
origin   
 
 
0.87*** 
(4.25)   
0.90*** 
(4.37) 
        
R2 0.1095 0.1408 0.1631 0.2350 0.1019 0.1514 0.2281 
N observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 
F-Statistic 1.37 1.54* 1.50* 2.27*** 1.06 1.38 2.18*** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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positive. We interpret this finding as evidence of the free-rider theory, which is, the acquirer in a 
tender offer needs to pay a higher premium to persuade the target shareholders to tender their 
shares. Our contested deal variable, however, is not significantly positive as other literature has 
reported. This might because, when a firm’s reputational risk is taken into consideration, the 
competition for targets won’t necessarily affect the premium as one firm can distinguish itself from 
other competitors through its better reputation.  
In column 3 and 4, we include firm-level and country-level variables. The major result on 
target RRIP remains the same, with the absolute value of the standardized beta coefficient 
decreasing from -0.19 to -0.12 after adding other control variables. However, deal value loses its 
significance after adding the target’s legal origin dummy. This finding suggests that the deal value 
variable is significant in Column 1, 2 and 3 only because it captures the difference in legal origin 
for different countries. More interestingly, the hostile bid becomes significantly negative after 
adding the target’s legal origin dummy, indicating that in a hostile bid, acquirers are likely to pay 
less for the target when considering its legal system. This finding, different from the work by 
Schwert (2000) and Rossi & Volpin (2004) who demonstrate a positive relation between hostile 
bid and acquisition premium, suggests that target’s legal origin aggravates the influence of hostile 
bid in cross-border M&As. The target legal origin variable is significantly and positively 
associated with the acquisition premium, consistent with previous literature, indicating a higher 
premium in countries with higher shareholder protection. The possible interpretation is that, since 
the acquisition premium measures the gain available to all target shareholders, the stronger 
shareholder protection helps reduce the cost of capital, and therefore increases the competition 
among bidders, leading to a higher premium. Moreover, Grossman & Hart (1980) illustrate the 
free-rider problem that is caused by higher shareholder protection, forcing bidders to overpay for 
the target.  
In column 5, 6 and 7, we repeat the previous regressions using target size, which is the 
logarithm of the target’s market capitalization four weeks before the announcement, as the proxy 
for transaction size instead of the deal value. Similar to our existing results, target RRIP is 
significantly and negatively associated with acquisition premium while target legal origin and 
tender offer are significantly and positively associated with acquisition premium. The absolute 
value of the standardized beta coefficient for target’s RRIP increases from -0.12 to -0.13 when 
target size, instead of deal value, is included in the model, indicating the larger economic 
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significance of the target’s reputational risk when controlling for target’s market value. This time, 
after adding the target legal origin dummy variable, the number of advisors that target hired during 
the negotiation process becomes significant positive in column 7. Considering the expert 
knowledge and skills that investment bankers can offer to their clients, target and acquirers often 
employ investment bankers to negotiate premiums (Eccles & Crane, 1988; Haunschild, 1994). 
Literature has demonstrated mixed results on the association between acquisition premium and 
advisory due to the potential agency conflicts that could happen for acquirers (Hayward, 2003; 
Porrini 2006). But for targets, since investment bankers’ fees are a percentage of the acquisition 
premiums, their advisories are more motivated to negotiate higher premiums for them.  
In M&As, there’re cases that target’s management team joins and manages acquirer’s 
company after the acquisition. Therefore, it is possible that the acquirer’s reputation could affect 
the acquisition premium as well. Thus, we include the acquirer’s reputational risk and acquirer’s 
legal origin in our regressions by estimating the following specification:  !"#	 %&'()*( = , + ./0&#'1	223% + 4	789*)&'&	223% + :5 + 6 (4.2) 
where X refers to a set of control variables including the logarithm of the transaction volume, 
horizontal dummy, the logarithm of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the 
announcement of the deal in US$ million, cash deal dummy, hostile deal dummy, tender offer 
dummy, contested deal dummy, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisor, and target’s and 
acquirer’s legal origin. 
Table 4.3 presents the regression results. Overall, the results remain the same as Table 4.2, 
with the only exception that hostile bid and the number of target advisory are no longer significant 
in column 6 and 7. This insignificant result on hostile bid suggests that this variable captures the 
difference between the target’s reputational risk and the acquirer’s reputational risk as well as the 
differences in the legal system between two countries. Concerning the role of target advisory, we 
interpret the findings as the evidence of the effect from the acquirer’s reputation that helps reduce 
the information asymmetry between target and acquirer. When the information on acquirer’s 
reputational risk is available for the target, it provides the target with additional information on 
acquirer’s overall quality when negotiating the price, reducing the need for advisor’s expert 
knowledge and skills.  
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression of Target/Acquirer RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium 
The table presents the results of seven OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variables are target/acquirer RRIP, which is equal to the highest level of the RRI over 
the last two years. The control variable at the cross-country level is target/acquirer legal origin, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the country has common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable 
that equals one if they belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the 
market capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables 
at the deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; 
deal value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal 
and zero otherwise; hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender 
offer, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy 
variable that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also 
include year and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Target RRIP -0.02*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.02** 
(-2.84) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.03) 
Acquirer RRIP 0.01 
(1.12) 
0.01 
(1.11) 
0.005 
(0.85) 
0.01 
(1.22) 
0.01 
(1.51) 
0.01 
(1.05) 
0.01 
(1.37) 
Horizontal   -0.04 (-0.2) 
-0.06 
(-0.27)  
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.049 
(-0.23) 
Target size    
 
 
 0.03 
(0.58) 
-0.043 
(-0.67) 
-0.02 
(-0.32) 
Deal value 0.1** 
(2.34) 
0.12*** 
(2.63) 
0.09 
(1.61) 
0.06 
(1.09)    
Cash deal    
0.15 
(0.72) 
-0.07 
(-0.30) 
 
 
0.12 
(0.56) 
-0.10 
(-0.45) 
Hostile deal  0.31 (0.35) 
0.44 
(0.48) 
0.30 
(0.33) 
0.56 
(0.61) 
0.87 
(0.94) 
0.53 
(0.59) 
Tender offer  0.32* (1.68) 
0.29 
(1.50) 
0.6*** 
(2.88) 
0.18 
(0.95) 
0.18 
(0.95) 
0.55** 
(2.63) 
Contested deal  0.30 (0.88) 
0.29 
(0.82) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.40 
(1.16) 
0.31 
(0.9) 
0.053 
(0.15) 
Target advisor   0.06 (0.56) 
0.16 
(0.60)  
0.12 
(1.18) 
0.10 
(0.97) 
Acquirer advisor   0.06 (0.72) 
0.07 
(0.79)  
0.13 
(1.59) 
0.11 
(1.33) 
Target legal 
origin   
 
 
0.77*** 
(3.15)   
0.81*** 
(3.34) 
Acquirer legal 
origin   
 
 
0.03 
(0.15)   
0.01 
(0.07) 
        
R2 0.2365 0.2602 0.2678 0.3210 0.2269 0.2568 0.3158 
N observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
F-Statistic 1.78** 1.77** 1.57** 1.89*** 1.48* 1.49* 1.85*** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Across both specifications, we find that the target’s reputational risk, which is measured by 
the target RRIP index, is significantly and negatively associated with the acquisition premium in 
cross-border M&As, consistent with our first hypothesis that there is a negative relation between 
target’s reputation risk and cross-border acquisition premium. The findings support our prediction 
that firm’s reputational risk carries information that can send a negative signal to the M&A market, 
resulting in a lower acquisition premium paid by acquirers. Due to information asymmetry in 
cross-border M&As, acquirers seek available information to compensate for the higher uncertainty 
that comes from the differences in culture, legal systems, corporate governance and investment 
environment, and the analysis of target’s social performance is an effective way to reduce 
information asymmetry and firm-specific risks.  
Despite the insignificant relation between acquirer’s reputational risk and acquisition 
premium, the differences in risk exposure between target and acquirer might play a role during the 
negotiation process; especially we study the targets that are completed owned by acquirers after 
the transaction. This ownership brings acquirer’s the attention to reputation differences since 
reputational capital is one of the most important intangible assets, and M&A activity transfers 
target’s intangible assets to the acquirer, which could benefit or hurt acquirer in the long run, 
depending on the quality of target’s asset. This concern will influence the acquirer’s valuation on 
target and affect the final premium. Therefore, our specification is: !"#	 %&'()*( = , + .(/0&#'1	223% − 789*)&'&	223%) + 45 + 6 (4.3) 
where X refers to a set of control variables including the logarithm of the transaction volume, 
horizontal dummy, the logarithm of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the 
announcement of the deal in US$ million, cash deal dummy, hostile deal dummy, tender offer 
dummy, contested deal dummy, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisor and target’s and 
acquirer’s legal origin. 
As shown in Table 4.4, the regression results are consistent with our hypothesis. The 
difference in reputational risk between target and acquirer is significantly and negatively 
associated with the cross-border acquisition premium. That is, the acquirer is likely to pay less for 
a target if it has worse ESG-related reputation than acquirer itself, as expected. The standardized 
beta coefficient for the difference in reputational risks is -0.23, indicating a 0.23 decrease in 
premium’s standard deviations when the standard deviations of the difference in reputational risks 
increase by 1. This finding supports the argument that the integration of intangible resources is  
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression of the Difference in RRIP between Target and Acquirer on Cross-Border 
Acquisition Premium 
The table presents the results of seven OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variable is the difference in RRIP index between target and acquirer. The control 
variable at the cross-country level is target/acquirer legal origin, a dummy variable that equals one if the country has 
common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable that equals one if they 
belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the market capitalization of 
the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables at the deal level are: 
target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; deal value, the 
logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal and zero otherwise; 
hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable 
that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable that equals one if 
the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year and industry (at 
one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Difference in 
RRIP 
-0.013** 
(-2.77) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.012** 
(-2.44) 
-0.01** 
(-2.4) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.01*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.012** 
(-2.63) 
Horizontal   -0.05 (-0.25) 
-0.06 
(-0.31)  
-0.03 
(-0.15) 
-0.05 
(-0.26) 
Target size    
 
 
 0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.06 
(-0.93) 
-0.028 
(-0.45) 
Deal value 0.10** 
(2.17) 
0.11** 
(2.47) 
0.10* 
(1.76) 
0.063 
(1.14)    
Cash deal    
0.16 
(0.74) 
-0.08 
(-0.38) 
 
 
0.12 
(0.56) 
-0.12 
(-0.54) 
Hostile deal  0.22 (0.24) 
0.29 
(0.31) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
0.51 
(0.55) 
1.79 
(0.84) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
Tender offer  0.32* (1.66) 
0.30 
(1.54) 
0.64*** 
(3.09) 
0.17 
(0.92) 
0.17 
(0.92) 
0.58*** 
(2.79) 
Contested deal  0.32 (0.93) 
0.32 
(0.90) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.42 
(1.2) 
034 
(0.97) 
0.045 
(0.13) 
Target advisor   0.05 (0.48) 
0.05 
(0.56)  
0.12 
(1.21) 
0.094 
(0.97) 
Acquirer advisor   0.02 (0.25) 
0.04 
(0.49)  
0.11 
(1.27) 
0.089 
(1.1) 
Target legal 
origin   
 
 
0.85*** 
(3.53)   
0.89*** 
(3.73) 
Acquirer legal 
origin    
0.04 
(0.19)   
0.02 
(0.1) 
         
R2 0.2129 0.2368 0.2416 0.3099 0.2053 0.2299 0.3046 
N observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
F-Statistic 1.62** 1.63** 1.42* 1.86*** 1.36 1.33 1.82*** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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vital for the successful post performance of M&As (Das & Teng, 2000). Through merger and 
acquisition, firms can access other firms’ key capabilities and resources, and the Resource-Based 
View (RBV) suggests that integrating intangible resources, which are valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable (VRIN), can contribute to a better post-performance for the acquirer (Sigera 
& Cahoonb, 2018). Compared with tangible assets, intangible assets are more difficult to develop 
and duplicate, making them more unique and heterogeneous. Regarding that, corporate reputation 
is identified as one of the most important strategic assets (Barnett et al., 2006). Although 
reputational asset is not easy to measure and integrate, based on three international M&As, 
Birkinshaw et al. (2000) introduce the two-sub processes to integrate intangible resources, 
including reputation integration, which is further developed by Sigera & Cahoonb (2018). They 
illustrate that reputation integration is slower than other asset integration and is usually undertaken 
after some acceptable performance is achieved. Our empirical results support this reputation-
integration argument by showing that the difference in reputational risk exposure between target 
and acquirer influences the valuation of the target in cross-border M&As.  
4.2 Investment Environment Analysis 
Table 4.5 presents the regression results with each column revealing the relationship between 
one investment environment index and the acquisition premium while controlling for deal size, 
target size, horizontal industry, cash deal, tender offer, hostile deal, contested deal and the number 
of target’s and acquirer’s advisors.  
Similar to our existing findings, the RRIP is significantly and negatively associated with 
acquisition premium in cross-border M&As after controlling for the investment environment 
characteristics, indicating a higher premium for the target with a better firm reputation after taking 
the investment environment into consideration. Column 1, 2, 5 and Column 6 measures the relation 
between ADRI and acquisition premium. Consistent with previous literature (Rossi & Volpin, 
2004; Starks & Wei, 2013), ADRI is positively related to the premium, which indicates that, on 
average, targets from countries with better shareholder protection command higher cross-border 
M&A premiums than otherwise. Similarly, as reported in Column 3 and Column 7, there is a 
positive association between the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment and the 
acquisition premium, which is, however, less economically significant than ADRI. Regarding the 
accounting standards, it is only significantly and positively related to acquisition premium when 
target size is used as the proxy for transaction size.  
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression of Target RRIP and Investment Environment Index on Cross-Border Acquisition 
Premium 
The table presents the results of eight OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variable is target RRIP, which is equal to the highest level of the RRI over the last 
two years. The control variables at the cross-country level are: target legal origin, a dummy variable that equals one 
if the country has common law system; proxies for investment environment, which include investor protection, 
accounting standards and judicial efficiency. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable that 
equals one if they belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables at the 
deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; deal 
value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal and 
zero otherwise; hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender offer, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable 
that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year 
and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target RRIP -0.01* 
(-1.66) 
-0.01** 
(-2.57) 
-0.01** 
(-2.16) 
-0.01** 
(-2.27) 
-0.01* 
(-1.70) 
-0.01*** 
(2.72) 
-0.01** 
(-2.15) 
-0.01** 
(-2.31) 
ADRI  0.27*** 
(3.73) 
    0.27*** (3.86) 
    
ANTI  0.22** (2.33)    
0.19** 
(2.01)   
Enforcement  
 
 0.13* 
(1.85) 
  
 
 
 
 0.15** 
(2.13)   
Accounting    0.01 (1.57)  
  0.01* (1.72) 
Target size     
 
 
-0.02 
(-0.4) 
-0.02 
(-0.31) 
-0.04 
(-0.82) 
-0.04 
(-0.76) 
Horizontal 0.14 
(0.81) 
0.17 
(0.97) 
0.12 
(0.66) 
0.13 
(0.73) 
0.16 
(0.95) 
0.20 
(1.16) 
0.15 
(0.86) 
0.17 
(0.94) 
Deal value 0.05 
(1.02) 
0.11** 
(2.12) 
0.06 
(1.18) 
0.07 
(1.39) 
    
Cash deal 0.11 
(0.57) 
0.32* 
(1.78) 
0.24 
(1.3) 
0.24 
(1.29) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
0.28 
(1.54) 
0.19 
(1.05) 
0.19 
(1.03) 
Hostile deal -0.97 
(-1.49) 
-0.85 
(-1.27) 
-0.85 
(-1.26) 
-0.80 
(-1.19) 
-0.80 
(-1.21) 
-0.52 
(-0.78) 
-0.60 
(-0.89) 
-0.52 
(-0.77) 
Tender offer 0.49*** 
(2.8) 
0.32* 
(1.79) 
0.29* 
(1.7) 
0.25 
(1.44) 
0.42** 
(2.43) 
0.16 
(0.99) 
0.19 
(1.14) 
0.13 
(0.79) 
Contested deal -0.07 
(-0.23) 
0.15 
(0.49) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.42) 
-0.07 
(-0.22) 
0.18 
(0.57) 
0.084 
(0.27) 
0.14 
(0.44) 
Target advisor 0.15* 
(1.77) 
0.12 
(1.32) 
0.14 
(1.57) 
0.12 
(1.39) 
0.18** 
(2.19) 
0.18** 
(2.08) 
0.19** 
(2.11) 
0.17* 
(1.96) 
Acquirer advisor 0.03 
(0.42) 
0.012 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.04 
(0.55) 
0.07 
(0.95) 
0.08 
(1.14) 
0.09 
(1.29) 
0.10 
(1.37) 
         
R2 0.2259 0.1908 0.1834 0.1792 0.2223 0.1729 0.1802 0.1732 
N observations 213 217 213 213 213 217 213 213 
F-Statistic 2.18*** 1.72** 1.68** 1.63** 2.14*** 1.52* 1.64** 1.57** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.3 Robustness Tests  
This subsection evaluates the alternative explanations for the findings reported in the paper. 
One concern with the transfer-in-reputational-asset statement is that, in cross-border M&As, the 
differences in culture, law, and regulation between two different countries might make it difficult 
to compare the reputational risk of firms from two countries since it is possible that one controversy 
that happens in country A is not considered controversial in country B. Moreover, prior literature 
has illustrated interesting findings towards U.S. targets in both domestic (Malik, 2014; Choi et al., 
2015) and international M&As (Rossi & Volpin, 2004; Starks & Wei, 2013). Therefore, to address 
our concern, we construct a U.S. target-only subsample and replicate our previous analysis to 
evaluate the transfer theory.  
Table 4.6 reports the coefficients of six OLS models derived from the specification 4.3 for 
U.S. target. Consistent with previous results from Table 4.4, the difference in RRIP between target 
and acquirer is significant and negative in all regressions, indicating a lower premium when the 
target has a worse reputation than the acquirer for U.S. targets. The standardized beta coefficient 
(not shown) for the difference is -0.16, indicating that one-point increase in the difference’s 
standard deviations leads to approximately 0.16 decrease in the premium’s standard deviations. 
Target size, this time, becomes significantly negative, that is, larger deals are associated with lower 
premiums when using target size as the proxy for deal size. Additionally, contested bids are 
associated with a 0.45 increase in the logarithm of premium, consistent with the view that premium 
is higher when there is competition among acquirers. Additionally, we report a significantly 
positive relation between the acquisition premium and cash deal for U.S. targets. Previous 
literature has reported mixed results on the influence of payment method on acquisition premium. 
Bowman et al. (2013), for example, find a significantly negative relation between cash deal and 
acquisition premium while Jory et al. (2016) and Gomes & Marsat (2017) find that cash deal is 
positively and significantly associated with acquisition premium. Schlingemann & Wu (2015), 
however, demonstrate no significant association between cash deal and acquisition premium. Our 
study illustrates that cash deal is associated with a higher acquisition premium in cross-border 
M&As for U.S. targets.  
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression of the Difference in RRIP between Target and Acquirer for U.S. Subsample on 
Cross-Border Acquisition Premium 
The table presents the results of six OLS regressions for the U.S. target sample of both domestic and cross-border 
deals. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price 
of the target four weeks before the announcement. Independent variable is the difference in RRIP index between U.S. 
target and acquirer. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable that equals one if they belong 
to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the market capitalization of the target 
four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables at the deal level are: target/acquirer 
advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; deal value, the logarithm of the 
transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal and zero otherwise; hostile deal, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals 
one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; cross-border, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal 
is cross border, and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable that equals one if the number of bidders is larger 
than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies (not shown). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Difference in RRIP -0.01** 
(-2.24) 
-0.01** 
(-2.27) 
-0.01** 
(-2.35)  
-0.01* 
(-1.93) 
-0.01** 
(-2.44) 
-0.01** 
(-2.48) 
Horizontal       
-0.05 
(-0.33) 
Target size    
 -0.07* 
(-1.71) 
-0.044 
(-0.94) 
-0.11** 
(-2.16) 
-0.12** 
(-2.34) 
Deal value  -0.03 (-0.71)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash deal     
0.28* 
(1.83) 
0.31** 
(2.09) 
0.31** 
(2.02) 
Hostile deal    -0.13 (-0.13) 
0.33 
(0.34) 
0.45 
(0.46) 
Tender offer    
 
 
0.09 
(0.52) 
0.13 
(0.77) 
0.08 
(0.45) 
Cross border  -0.02 
(-0.15) 
-0.03 
(-0.19) 
-0.04 
(-0.24) 
-0.11 
(-0.72) 
-0.16 
(-1.09) 
-0.15 
(-1.01) 
Contested deal       
0.45* 
(1.7) 
Public acquirer       
0.014 
(0.06) 
Target advisor      
0.17** 
(1.98) 
0.16* 
(1.84) 
Acquirer advisor      0.11* (1.72) 
0.12* 
(1.87) 
       
R2 0.1053 0.1073 0.1172 0.1349 0.1676 0.1793 
N observations 241 241 241 241 241 241 
F-Statistic 1.06 1.03 1.14 1.18 1.41** 1.37** 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Our results of the higher premiums for targets from countries with common-law traditions 
are consistent with previous studies (Rossi & Volpin, 2004). In those countries, however, the effect 
of firm reputation might be less pronounced than it is in civil-law countries because civil-law 
countries are associated with a lower level of shareholder protection, which are more likely to have 
corruption and human rights violations problems. Therefore, we focus on the interaction between 
the target’s reputation building, that is, its RRIP, and target’s legal origin.  
As reported in Table 4.7, however, we fail to find any significant effects of the interaction 
term of target’s RRIP and its legal origin after controlling for target’s legal origin, indicating that 
RRIP is not dependent on legal origins. Therefore, the findings do not support the hypothesis about 
reputation building and country legal origin. 
As a further robustness check, we estimate specification 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 using RRI index as 
the proxy for a firm’s reputational risk instead. Similar to the RRIP index, RRI is a proprietary 
algorithm developed by RepRisk that dynamically captures and quantifies reputational risk 
exposure related to ESG issues. Instead of focusing on the peak level of the firm’s reputational 
risk exposure, RRI index provides an overview of the associations between a company and its ESG 
issues on a monthly basis.  
We collect the RRI data that happens before the premium date from the RepRisk platform 
for each firm and replicate our analysis on the cross-country sample. Table 4.8 reports the results 
of eight regressions based on the  specification 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
In specification 4.1, target RRI remains significantly negative until the target legal origin is 
included in the model, suggesting that the lower premium is a feature of the target’s legal origin. 
The results are very similar to our primary empirical results of Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. 
The significant negative relation between target’s RRI, the difference in reputational risk between 
the target and acquirer, and the acquisition premium hold when we replace RRIP index with RRI 
index. Especially, when adding the acquirer’s RRI index to the model, the insignificant coefficients 
of Target RRI in column 2 and 4 from Table 4.8 become significantly negative again.  
To eliminate the possible influences from the outliers, we conduct another robustness test 
based on our previous cross-country sample but without countries with extremely high premiums 
(New Zealand and Japan) and countries with extremely low premiums (Switzerland), and the 
results are reported in Table 4.9. As we expected, the results remain basically the same as our 
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Table 4.7: OLS Regression of Target RRIP and the Interaction between Target RRIP and Target Legal 
Origin on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium 
The table presents the results of six OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variables are target RRIP, which is equal to the highest level of the RRI over the last 
two years, and the interaction term between target RRIP and target legal origin. The control variable at the cross-
country level is target legal origin, a dummy variable that equals one if the country has common law system. Control 
variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable that equals one if they belong to the same industry at two-
digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the 
announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables at the deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number 
of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; deal value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; 
cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal and zero otherwise; hostile deal, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves 
a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than 
one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies 
(not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Target RRIP -0.02** 
(-3.47) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.9) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.01 
(-1.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.91) 
-0.01 
(-0.99) 
Target RRIP * target lo 0.014** 
(2.31) 
0.019*** 
(3.04) 
0.02*** 
(2.84) 
-0.003 
(-0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.0005 
(-0.06) 
Horizontal   0.18 (1.04) 
  0.11 (0.64) 
Deal value 0.07* 
(1.9) 
0.11*** 
(2.79) 
0.07 
(1.38) 
0.06* 
(1.67) 
0.11*** 
(2.84) 
0.06 
(1.32) 
Cash deal    
0.13 
(0.73) 
  
 
0.014 
(0.08) 
Hostile deal  -1.21* (-1.84) 
-0.98 
(-1.48) 
 -1.43** 
(-2.24) 
-1.23* 
(-1.87) 
Tender offer  0.49*** (2.90) 
0.44** 
(2.53) 
 0.66*** 
(3.79) 
0.62*** 
(3.45) 
Contested deal  0.10 (0.35) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
 -0.02 
(-0.06) 
-0.07 
(-0.23) 
Target advisor   0.13 (1.48) 
  0.12 (1.47) 
Acquirer advisor   0.05 (0.64) 
  0.04 (0.62) 
Target legal origin    0.58** (2.14) 
0.90*** 
(3.24) 
0.88*** 
(3.09) 
       
R2 0.1327 0.1795 0.1968 0.1523 0.2215 0.2350 
N observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
F-Statistic 1.60* 1.95*** 1.81*** 1.78** 2.41*** 2.17*** 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.8: OLS Regression of Target RRI on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium 
The table presents the results of eight OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variables include target RRI, which denotes the current level of media and stakeholder 
coverage of a company related to ESG issues, and the difference in RRI index between target and acquirer. The control 
variable at the cross-country level is target/acquirer legal origin, a dummy variable that equals one if the country has 
common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable that equals one if they 
belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the market capitalization of 
the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables at the deal level are: 
target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; deal value, the 
logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal and zero otherwise; 
hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable 
that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable that equals one if 
the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year and industry (at 
one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Target RRI only Target & Acquirer RRI Difference in RRI 
Target RRI -0.01* 
(-1.69) 
-0.006 
(-0.98) 
-0.012* 
(-1.83) 
-0.007 
(-1.11) 
-0.02* 
(-1.85) 
-0.02** 
(-2.00)  
 
 
Acquirer RRI     0.01 (1.13) 
0.01 
(1.39)   
Difference in 
RRI       
-0.01* 
(-1.76) 
-0.012** 
(-2.05) 
Horizontal 0.15 
(0.87) 
0.11 
(0.65) 
0.20 
(1.11) 
0.13 
(0.78) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.002 
(-0.01) 
-0.015 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
Target size  
  
-0.034 
(-0.63) 
-0.01 
(-0.16)  
-0.02 
(-0.34)  
-0.03 
(-0.48) 
Deal value 0.09* 
(1.78) 
0.065 
(1.34)   
0.065 
(1.15)  
0.064 
(1.15)  
Cash deal 0.28 
(1.54) 
0.016 
(0.09) 
0.24 
(1.35) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.02 
(-0.1) 
-0.06 
(-0.27) 
-0.05 
(-0.21) 
-0.08 
(-0.38) 
Hostile deal -0.76 
(-1.1) 
-1.22* 
(-1.84) 
-0.43 
(-0.62) 
-1.03 
(-1.55) 
0.42 
(0.46) 
0.7 
(0.75) 
0.34 
(0.38) 
0.65 
(0.7) 
Tender offer 0.28 
(1.64) 
0.62*** 
(3.44) 
0.14 
(0.88) 
0.54*** 
(3.04) 
0.57*** 
(2.65) 
0.5** 
(2.36) 
0.59*** 
(2.76) 
0.51** 
(2.44) 
Contested deal 0.16 
(0.54) 
-0.08 
(-0.27) 
0.19 
(0.62) 
-0.06 
(-0.22) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
Target advisor 0.14 
(1.58) 
0.13 
(1.57) 
0.2** 
(2.31) 
0.17** 
(2.04) 
0.1 
(0.96) 
0.13 
(1.4) 
0.1 
(1.00) 
0.14 
(1.47) 
Acquirer 
advisor 
0.035 
(0.48) 
0.033 
(0.47) 
0.10 
(1.41) 
0.07 
(1.06) 
0.04 
(0.5) 
0.09 
(1.04) 
0.03 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.93) 
Target legal 
origin 
 
 
0.9*** 
(4.38)  
0.93*** 
(4.5) 
0.76*** 
(3.04) 
0.8*** 
(3.24) 
0.8*** 
(3.3) 
0.8*** 
(3.46) 
Acquirer legal 
origin     
0.1 
(0.52) 
0.09 
(0.45) 
0.11 
(0.55) 
0.09 
(0.47) 
         
R2 0.1545 0.2275 0.1383 0.2203 0.3004 0.2944 0.2971 0.2917 
N observations 219 219 219 219 176 176 176 176 
F-Statistic 1.37 2.17*** 1.24 2.09*** 1.72** 1.67** 1.75** 1.71** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effect Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.9: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium (Excluding Outliers) 
The table presents the results of six OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variables include target RRIP, acquirer RRIP and the difference in RRIP between 
target and acquirer. The control variable at the cross-country level is target/acquirer legal origin, a dummy variable 
that equals one if the country has common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy 
variable that equals one if they belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm 
of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control 
variables at the deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the 
transaction; deal value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a 
cash deal and zero otherwise; hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; 
tender offer, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we 
also include year and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Target RRIP only Target & Acquirer RRIP Difference in RRIP 
Target RRIP -0.008* 
(-1.9) 
-0.01*** 
(-1.99) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.06)  
 
 
Acquirer RRIP   0.01 (1.14) 
0.01 
(1.24)   
Difference in 
RRIP     
-0.01** 
(-2.35) 
-0.012** 
(-2.54) 
Horizontal 0.19 
(1.14) 
0.2 
(1.22) 
0.06 
(0.3) 
0.076 
(0.36) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.29) 
Target size  -0.001 (-0.00)  
-0.003 
(-0.04)  
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
Deal value 0.045 
(0.97)  
0.045 
(0.83)  
0.05 
(0.91)  
Cash deal 0.16 
(0.87) 
0.14 
(0.79) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
Hostile deal -1.14* 
(-1.81) 
-1.03 
(-1.62) 
0.34 
(0.38) 
0.47 
(0.53) 
0.22 
(0.25) 
0.39 
(0.44) 
Tender offer 0.54*** 
(3.1) 
0.49*** 
(2.85) 
0.56*** 
(2.73) 
0.52** 
(2.57) 
0.61*** 
(2.97) 
0.56*** 
(2.76) 
Contested deal -0.03 
(-0.12) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.07 
(0.2) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
Target advisor 0.10 
(1.25) 
0.12** 
(1.55) 
0.04 
(0.47) 
0.07 
(0.69) 
0.04 
(0.44) 
0.07 
(0.71) 
Acquirer advisor 0.07 
(1.00) 
0.1 
(1.40) 
0.09 
(1.06) 
0.12 
(1.43) 
0.06 
(0.71) 
0.09 
(1.16) 
Target legal 
origin 
0.8*** 
(4.08) 
0.84*** 
(4.20) 
0.69*** 
(2.86) 
0.73*** 
(3.05) 
0.77*** 
(3.23) 
0.81*** 
(3.43) 
Acquirer legal 
origin   
0.15 
(0.79) 
0.14 
(0.75) 
0.16 
(0.81) 
0.15 
(0.76) 
       
R2 0.2433 0.2395 0.3136 0.3102 0.3000 0.2960 
N observations 215 215 173 173 173 173 
F-Statistic 2.32*** 2.28*** 1.79*** 1.76** 1.74** 1.71** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 previous findings in Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. The significantly negative association 
between the acquisition premium in cross-border M&As and firm’s reputational risk hold even 
when we remove the outliers.  
Additionally, the time span might be a concern for our empirical analysis. It is possible that 
the signaling effect from the firm reputation would disappear and the announcement effect would 
rise when the market anticipates an M&A announcement soon. For instance, Laamanen (2007) 
and Starks and Wei (2013) use premiums 1 week prior to the original announcement date. 
Therefore, we use the acquisition premiums 1 week before the announcement date as the 
alternative measurement of the difference between the bid price and the target’s stock price to 
reevaluate the validity of our analysis about firm reputation. As shown in Table 4.10, the results 
for all three specifications remain consistent with our previous findings. The target’s ESG 
reputational risk is negatively and significantly associated with the acquisition premium, and the 
difference in the firm’s reputational risk is also significantly and negatively related to the 
acquisition premium. 
Our last robustness test is about the feature of the hostile deals. As hostile deals only 
represent 1.4% of the total acquisitions in our sample, and they are usually accomplished by tender 
offers, we exclude those hostile deals and keep the tender offers for robustness check in our three 
specifications. The results are presented in Table 4.11, and the main reputational risk variables get 
slightly more significant after removing the hostile deals. Overall, excluding hostile deals do not 
affect our main findings.  
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Table 4.10: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium (Alternative Premium) 
The table presents the results of six OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target 1 week before the 
announcement. Independent variables include target RRIP, acquirer RRIP and the difference in RRIP between target 
and acquirer. The control variable at the cross-country level is target/acquirer legal origin, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the country has common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy variable 
that equals one if they belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm of the 
market capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control variables 
at the deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the transaction; 
deal value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a cash deal 
and zero otherwise; hostile deal, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is hostile and zero otherwise; tender 
offer, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise; contested, a dummy 
variable that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero otherwise. In all regressions, we also 
include year and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Target RRIP only Target & Acquirer RRIP Difference in RRIP 
Target RRIP -0.01** 
(2.06) 
-0.01** 
(-2.13) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.85)  
 
 
Acquirer RRIP   0.001 (0.21) 
0.01 
(0.42)   
Difference in 
RRIP     
-0.01* 
(1.64) 
-0.01* 
(-1.92) 
Horizontal 0.10 
(0.54) 
0.13 
(0.73) 
0.07 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.36) 
0.06 
(0.26) 
0.07 
(0.32) 
Target size  -0.03 (-0.56)  
-0.03 
(-0.49)  
-0.05 
(-0.68) 
Deal value 0.07 
(1.37)  
0.09 
(1.39)  
0.09 
(1.45)  
Cash deal 0.08 
(0.40) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
Hostile deal -1.19* 
(-1.68) 
-0.93 
(-1.31) 
0.58 
(0.59) 
0.93 
(0.93) 
0.40 
(0.40) 
0.81 
(0.79) 
Tender offer 0.49** 
(2.52) 
0.39** 
(2.01) 
0.47** 
(2.05) 
0.39* 
(1.70) 
0.54** 
(2.32) 
0.45* 
(1.92) 
Contested deal -0.29 
(-0.9) 
-0.27 
(-0.85) 
-0.10 
(-0.26) 
-0.08 
(-0.21) 
-0.11 
(-0.29) 
-0.09 
(-0.24) 
Target advisor 0.16* 
(1.80) 
0.21** 
(2.38) 
0.13 
(1.22) 
0.18* 
(1.71) 
0.13 
(1.15) 
0.19* 
(1.70) 
Acquirer advisor 0.04 
(0.47) 
0.09 
(1.20) 
0.05 
(0.59) 
0.12 
(1.30) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.09 
(0.96) 
Target legal 
origin 
0.69*** 
(3.11) 
0.71*** 
(3.20) 
0.53* 
(1.94) 
0.58** 
(2.16) 
0.65** 
(2.42) 
0.71*** 
(2.64) 
Acquirer legal 
origin   
0.19 
(0.87) 
0.16 
(0.76) 
0.20 
(0.91) 
0.17 
(0.78) 
       
R2 0.2020 0.1956 0.2875 0.2788 0.2626 0.2540 
N observations 219 219 176 176 176 176 
F-Statistic 1.89*** 1.80*** 1.61** 1.55** 1.48* 1.41* 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.11: OLS Regression of Target RRIP on Cross-Border Acquisition Premium (Excluding Hostile) 
The table presents the results of six OLS regressions for the sample of cross-border deals. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of premium, or the bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the announcement. Independent variables include target RRIP, acquirer RRIP and the difference in RRIP between 
target and acquirer. The control variable at the cross-country level is target/acquirer legal origin, a dummy variable 
that equals one if the country has common law system. Control variables at the firm level are: horizontal, a dummy 
variable that equals one if they belong to the same industry at two-digit SIC-code level, and target size, the logarithm 
of the market capitalization of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal in US$ million. Control 
variables at the deal level are: target/acquirer advisor, the number of target’s and acquirer’s advisors involved in the 
transaction; deal value, the logarithm of the transaction volume; cash deal, a dummy variable that equals one if it is a 
cash deal and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals one if the deal involves a tender offer and 
zero otherwise; contested, a dummy variable that equals one if the number of bidders is larger than one and zero 
otherwise. In all regressions, we also include year and industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies (not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Target RRIP only Target & Acquirer RRIP Difference in RRIP 
Target RRIP -0.01* 
(-1.89) 
-0.01* 
(-1.91) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.01)  
 
 
Acquirer RRIP   0.01 (1.23) 
0.01 
(1.38)   
Difference in 
RRIP     
-0.01** 
(-2.40) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.63) 
Horizontal 0.15 
(0.90) 
0.17 
(1.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.28) 
-0.05 
(-0.25) 
-0.07 
(-0.31) 
-0.06 
(-0.28) 
Target size  -0.03 (-0.50)  
-0.01 
(-0.20)  
-0.02 
(-0.36) 
Deal value 0.05 
(1.00)  
0.06 
(1.17)  
0.07 
(1.20)  
Cash deal 0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.07 
(-0.31) 
-0.1 
(-0.49) 
-0.08 
(-0.38) 
-0.12 
(-0.57) 
Tender offer 0.54*** 
(3.10) 
0.48*** 
(2.76) 
0.61*** 
(2.99) 
0.57*** 
(2.77) 
0.65*** 
(3.17) 
0.60*** 
(2.92) 
Contested deal -0.02 
(-0.05) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
Target advisor 0.14* 
(1.67) 
0.17** 
(2.10) 
0.05 
(0.56) 
0.09 
(0.91) 
0.05 
(0.54) 
0.09 
(0.92) 
Acquirer advisor 0.06 
(0.78) 
0.09 
(1.35) 
0.06 
(0.76) 
0.10 
(1.28) 
0.04 
(0.48) 
0.09 
(1.07) 
Target legal 
origin 
0.81*** 
(3.99) 
0.83*** 
(4.12) 
0.78*** 
(3.20) 
0.83*** 
(3.46) 
0.85*** 
(3.56) 
0.91*** 
(3.83) 
Acquirer legal 
origin   
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.0005 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
       
R2 0.2210 0.2179 0.3205 0.3141 0.3097 0.3034 
N observations 219 219 176 176 176 176 
F-Statistic 2.19*** 2.15*** 1.96*** 1.90*** 1.93** 1.87*** 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Using a sample of cross-border deals in 36 different countries, announced between 2007 and 
2017, we find that the firm with a better ESG-related reputation is associated with a higher 
acquisition premium in cross-border deals, and this relation is robust across different investment 
environment. Also, acquirers are likely to pay more for targets with the better reputation than 
themselves, indicating a concern for the potential reputation transfer from target to acquirer after 
the acquisition. In the U.S. target subsample, we find consistent negative results between the 
difference in reputational risk between the target and acquirer and the cross-border acquisition 
premium. Additionally, this negative association remains robust when controlling for different 
investment environment characteristics. Those results support for our argument concerning the 
signaling role of a firm’s reputation as a mechanism that reduces the information asymmetry 
between the target and acquirer in cross-border M&As. Also, our study indicates that firm’s 
socially irresponsible performances, similar to its socially responsible behaviors, could affect the 
firm value in cross-border M&As.  
The present findings can also contribute to answering the broader question of how 
information asymmetry affects cross-border premiums. Due to the different culture, corporate 
governance, law system and regulations, there is a higher uncertainty and information asymmetry 
between the foreign target and acquirer, making it more difficult for firms to conduct target 
assessment and valuation. Therefore, acquirers are motivated to utilize available signals to gain 
useful information about the target, and our study suggests that a firm’s ESG-related reputation 
level could help reduce the information asymmetry by sending out a signal of the firm’s overall 
quality.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
1. Firm-level variables 
Variables Notations Descriptions Data source(s) 
 
 
Target/Acquirer 
RRIP 
 
 
 
 
Target/Acquirer 
RRI 
 
 
 
Difference in 
RRIP/RRI 
between target 
and acquirer 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal 
 
 
 
 
Target size 
 
 
 
 
TARGETRRIP 
ACQUIRERRRIP 
 
 
 
 
TARGETRRI 
ACQUIRERRRI 
 
 
 
 
DIFFERENCEINRRI 
DIFFERENCEINRRIP 
 
 
 
 
 
HORIZONTAL 
 
 
 
 
LNTARGETEQUITY 
 
 
An index that is equal to the 
highest level of the RRI over the 
last two years – a proxy for 
overall ESG and business risk 
exposure. 
 
 
An index that denotes the 
current level of media and 
stakeholder coverage of a 
company related to ESG issues. 
 
 
Target’s RRIP/RRI index minus 
acquirer’s RRIP/RRI index.  
 
 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to one if they belong to the same 
industry at two-digit SIC-code 
level, and zero otherwise.  
 
 
The logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the target four 
weeks before the announcement 
of the deal in US$ million. 
 
 
RepRisk 
Platform 
 
 
 
 
RepRisk 
Platform 
 
 
 
 
RepRisk 
Platform 
 
 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
 
 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
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2. Deal-level variables 
Variables Notations Descriptions Data source(s) 
Premium LNPREMIUM4WEEK 
 
The natural logarithm of bid 
price as a percentage of the 
closing price of the target four 
weeks before the announcement. 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
Deal Value LNDV The natural logarithm of the deal value. 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
 
Cash deal CASHDEAL 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the acquisition is entirely 
paid in cash, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
Hostile deal HOSTILE 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the bid is classified as 
unsolicited, 0 otherwise. 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
Tender offer TENDER 
 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the acquisition is done 
through a tender offer, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
Contested CONTESTED 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the number of bidders is 
larger than one, 0 otherwise. 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
Cross border CROSSBORDER 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the target country differs 
from the acquirer country, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
Target/Acquirer 
advisor 
TARGETADVISOR 
ACQUIRERADVISOR 
 
The number of advisors that 
target/acquirer hired during the 
transaction. 
 
Thomson 
Financial 
SDC 
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3. Country-level variables 
Variables Notations Descriptions Data source(s) 
 
 
 
Target Legal  
Origin 
 
 
 
Acquirer Legal 
Origin  
 
 
 
 
ADRI(LLSV) 
 
 
 
 
 
ADRI(Spamann) 
 
 
 
Enforcement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TARGETLO 
 
 
 
 
ACQUIRERLO 
 
 
 
 
 
ADRI 
 
 
 
 
ANTI 
 
 
 
 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTING 
 
 
 
 
 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the target country has 
common law system, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
 
A dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the acquirer country has 
common law system, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
 
An index ranges from 0 to 6 
that aggregates the shareholder 
rights. A higher value indicates 
better shareholder protection. 
 
 
An index aggregating corrected 
anti-director rights from 0 to 6.  
 
An index ranges from 0 to 10 
that assesses efficiency and 
integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects 
business, particularly foreign 
firms, with a higher value better 
judicial efficiency. 
 
An index created by examining 
and rating companies’ 1990 
annual reports on their inclusion 
or omission of 90 items. A 
minimum of 3 companies in 
each country were studied.  
 
 
CIA 
Factbook 
 
 
 
CIA 
Factbook 
 
 
 
 
 
La Porta et 
al. (1998) 
 
 
 
Spamann 
(2005) 
 
 
 
La Porta et 
al. (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La Porta et 
al. (1998)  
 
 
 
 
	
 
